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JANUS: OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DEATH OF 
STARE DECISIS, BUT ONLY AS IT RELATES TO 
UNIONS 
By Amanda R. Clark and Susan M. Matta 
Amanda Clark is an associate at Asher, Gittler & D’Alba, Ltd., joining the firm in 2013. She 
practices public sector labor law with various locals, including trade union units and firefighter 
units across the state, dealing with contract negotiations, interest arbitrations and contract 
enforcement issues. Amanda also practices private sector labor law, dealing with issues such as 
unit recognition and contract enforcement. She is a member of the American Bar Association, 
Section of Labor and Employment Law and the State and Local Government Bargaining and 
Employment Law Committee. Amanda is a yearly co-author of a report on public sector 
grievance developments from across the country for the Committee. Amanda previously co-
authored, “The Future of Public Sector Bargaining: One Decision to Undo Them All," in 2014 for 
the Illinois Public Employee Relations Report.  
Amanda received a Bachelor of Science in Politics and Government & Scandinavian Studies, 
Summa Cum Laude, from North Park University. She received her Juris Doctor from IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law graduating with a Certificate in Labor and Employment Law from 
The Institute for Law and the Workplace. In 2018 she was named an Emerging Lawyer in 
Illinois by Leading Lawyers. 
Susan Matta is a partner with Asher, Gittler & D’Alba, Ltd.  Her union career began in 1995, 
when she entered the AFL-CIO Organizing Institute’s Apprenticeship Program, and later 
became a staff union organizer at UFCW Local 951, where she worked on NLRB election 
campaigns and corporate pressure campaigns.  After graduating from law school, Susan served 
as a Law Fellow with Service Employees International Union on a corporate pressure campaign 
against a local hospital chain, where she represented individuals who were sued for medical 
debt.  Susan then served as the General Counsel for Service Employees International Union, 
Local 73 for almost ten years, where she represented both public and private employees.  As in-
house General Counsel, Susan gained invaluable and extensive knowledge of the institutional 
concerns and needs of unions, conducted numerous trainings for both staff and members, and 
gained extensive experience representing the union in negotiations, arbitrations, State and 
Federal Court, and before the National Labor Relations Board, Illinois Labor Relations Board, 
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, Illinois Department of Human Rights and Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission.    
In 2013, Susan transitioned to private practice with Carmell Charone Widmer Moss & Barr, 
where she became a partner and focused on representing firefighter clients.  She is experienced 
at representing firefighter unions, small and large, in contract negotiations, contract 
enforcement, interest arbitration, unfair labor practice proceedings, and court litigation.  In 
2019, she joined Asher, Gittler & D’Alba, where she continues to focus on representing firefighter 
clients.  





Forty-one years ago, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,[1] the United 
States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of what is commonly 
referred to as “fair share” or “agency” fees. Fair share fees apply to 
governmental employees who are in a bargaining unit represented by a 
union, but choose not to become members of the union. The Abood Court 
weighed employee free speech rights against the government’s managerial 
interests, and found that the government’s interest in labor peace 
outweighed any harm caused by requiring employees to pay fair share 
fees.[2] Exclusive representation is an essential element of labor peace.  
Without it, government employers would be faced with conflicting demands 
from various sources, thereby, impeding the provision of public services.[3]  
The Court found that the government had an interest in a financially stable 
bargaining partner.[4] However, recognizing that unions engage in political 
activities, the Court found that employees could not be required to subsidize 
political causes they opposed.[5] The Court balanced the conflciting interests 
by requiring non-members to pay fees associated only with “collective 
bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment,” and 
prohibiting unions from charging non-members for their political and 
ideological activities.[6]   
In response, “[o]ver 20 States have by now enacted statutes authorizing fair-
share provisions. To be precise, 22 States, the District of Columbia, and 
Puerto Rico–plus another two States for police and firefighter unions.”[7]  
Illinois is one of those States. The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act 
(“IPLRA”) is founded upon strong public policy favoring collective 
bargaining rights for public employees.[8]  In addition to the establishment 
of the right to organize, bargain collectively through an exclusive 
representative, and strike,[9] the IPLRA requires non-members to pay fair 
share fees to unions that represent them.[10]   
Mark Janus, a non-member of a bargaining unit represented by the 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 
was required to pay a fair share fee of a mere $44.58 per month, or $535 per 
year.[11]  He challenged the imposition of these fair share fees on the basis 
that they violated his First Amendment rights by compelling him to support 
the union.  In Janus, the Court relied upon the dicta from Knox v. Service 
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Employees International Union, Local 1000 and Harris v. Quinn, that 
referred to the Abood decision as an “an anomaly.”[12] The Court overturned 
Abood and held the fair share fees unconstitutional.  
The Janus decision is wrought with contradictions and personal opinions on 
unions.  It is a decision that can only be characterized as legislating from the 
bench; it is evident from the majority opinion, that this decision was crafted 
six years ago, and the Court simply waited for the right opportunity to 
overturn Abood.  Sadly, this is not the most troubling aspect of the Court’s 
ruling, as the decision flies in the face of the principles of stare decisis, 
represents a significant step away from promoting democracy in the 
workplace, and raises more constitutional questions than it resolves.  In 
addition, as will be discussed below, the Janus decision undermines our 
system of jurisprudence, and is completely contrary to the very notion of 
democracy. 
II. ABOOD FIT SQUARELY WITHIN FIRST AMENDMENT 
PRINCIPLES 
The Court’s initial rationale for overturning Abood stems from the misplaced 
notion that fair share fees amount to compelling the fee-payer “to subsidize” 
the speech of other private speakers.[13]  Relying on Friedrichs v. California 
Teachers Assn.,[14] Knox, and Harris, the majority determined that fair 
share fees failed the exacting scrutiny test.[15] This test requires “a 
compelled subsidy [to] serve ‘a compelling state interest that cannot be 
achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational 
freedoms.’”[16]  The majority determined that “the First Amendment does 
not permit the government to compel a person to pay for another party’s 
speech just because the government thinks that the speech furthers the 
interests of the person who does not want to pay.”[17]  
The majority’s rationale suffers from significant flaws. Perhaps, the most 
glaring flaw is the comparison between unions and groups that lobby on 
behalf of “senior citizens or veterans or physicians.”[18] Such an analogy 
ignores the unique nature of the legal relationship between unions and 
bargaining unit employees. Unlike unions, these other groups are not 
required to represent any interests held by non-members. Rather, any 
benefits conferred upon non-members are incidental to the group’s efforts to 
benefit its members.  In addition, these groups are allowed to give members 
special benefits to make membership more attractive.  On the other hand, 




unions are required to fairly represent all bargaining unit employees, 
regardless of membership status, which includes pursuing costly litigation 
on behalf of non-members. This obligation significantly impedes a union’s 
ability to make membership more attractive. Accordingly, the Janus Court’s 
analogy completely misses the mark. 
Moreover, the Court’s findings are completely contrary to long-standing 
precedent. “The Court’s decisions have long made plain that government 
entities have substantial latitude to regulate their employees’ speech, 
especially about the terms of employment, in the interest of operating their 
workplaces effectively.”[19]  Indeed, the Abood Court acknowledged the 
importance of labor peace, and the “significant benefits” resulting from 
exclusive representation and an adequately funded exclusive 
representative.[20] The Court has consistently upheld government 
restrictions on speech related to workplace operations.[21]  Fair share fees 
are an example of an allowable governmental restriction on employee speech 
because they advance the government’s interest in regulating the workplace.  
When a union engages in collective bargaining or contract enforcement, the 
speech involved in those activities is “intimately tied to the workplace and 
employment relationship” because it “occurred (almost always) in the 
workplace; and the speech was directed (at least mainly) to the 
employer.”[22] Thus, fair share fees have long been considered a permissible 
restriction on employee speech rights. 
Contrary to this approach, the Janus majority now finds that compelling 
speech is a far greater injury than restricting it.[23]  The majority views fair 
share fees in the same light as compelled speech based on the notion that 
“compelled subsidization of private speech seriously impinges on First 
Amendment rights.”[24] Yet, as Justice Kagan notes in her dissent, “the 
majority’s distinction between compelling and restricting speech also lacks 
force” because the only case cited in support of this argument “is possibly 
(thankfully) the most exceptional in our First Amendment annals.”[25]  
Importantly, the majority ignores the unique nature of the relationship 
between exclusive representation and fair share fees.  Although the majority 
recognizes that the requirement imposed upon unions to serve as an 
exclusive representative is “itself a significant impingement on associational 
freedoms that would not be tolerated in other contexts,” it rejects the notion 
that exclusive representation and agency fees are inextricably linked.[26] 
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Apparently, sufficient justification for this proposition is evident in how 
“avidly” unions seek to represent employees in states that do not permit fair 
share fees.[27]  For these reasons, the majority believes that fair share fees 
impermissibly compel one to not only support, but also subsidize, the speech 
of another.[28]  
The majority view demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
nature of collective bargaining.  Public sector unions are comprised solely of 
governmental employees, and exist for the purpose of representing all 
bargaining unit employees concerning their terms and conditions of 
employment. “The tasks of negotiating and administering a collective- 
bargaining agreement and representing the interests of employees in settling 
disputes and processing grievances are continuing and difficult ones,” 
requiring the “expenditure of much time and money.”[29]  Simply stated, no 
other situation is even remotely analogous to the plight now faced by unions 
– where an entity is compelled by the government to provide expensive and 
valuable services for free. Notwithstanding the balance struck by Abood, 
which remained workable for over four decades, the Supreme Court now 
finds that fair share fees cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.   
A. States Continue to Have Compelling Justifications for 
Imposing Agency Fees 
The Abood Court deferred to the State’s interest in maintaining labor peace 
and preventing free riders as compelling justifications for permitting fair 
share fees.[30] However, the Janus majority summarily dismisses these 
justifications in the absence of compelling reasons. As the Abood Court 
recognized, labor peace and exclusive representation are inextricably 
intertwined.[31] Exclusive representation avoids conflicts associated with 
inter-union rivalries, multiple demands from multiple unions for the same 
groups of employees, and confusion stemming from having to enforce 
multiple collective bargaining agreements that cover the same groups of 
employees.[32] Unable to argue that labor peace is not a compelling state 
interest, the majority criticizes the lack of “evidence that the pandemonium 
[the Abood Court] imagined would result if agency fees were not allowed,” 
claiming that such “fears were unfounded.”[33] But the majority goes further 
and finds that “[t]he Abood Court assumed that designation of a union as the 
exclusive representative of all the employees in a unit and the exaction of agency 
fees are inextricably linked, but that is simply not true.”[34]  




To illustrate its point, the majority cites to the experiences in federal 
employment and the twenty-eight states that require exclusive 
representation without agency fees.[35] The majority finds that, because 
labor peace can be achieved without imposing fair share fees, the two are not 
“inextricably linked.”[36] The majority also finds that the benefits and 
privileges associated with its status as the exclusive representative “greatly 
outweigh any extra burden imposed by the duty of providing fair 
representation for nonmembers.”[37] The majority’s anti-union sentiments 
are perhaps most evident in the gross understatement of the union’s duty of 
fair representation–that it obligates the union to refrain from acting solely for the 
benefit of members.[38] Indeed, the duty of fair representation imposes far 
greater obligations, and costs, upon unions than the majority is willing to 
admit.  Instead of addressing this dilemma, the majority simply ignores it.   
Fair share fees are rooted “in the ‘principle of exclusive union 
representation’–a ‘central element’ in ‘industrial relations’ since the New 
Deal.”[39] Consequently, the courts “have granted substantial latitude to the 
government, in recognition of its significant interests in managing its 
workforce so as to best serve the public.”[40] Thus, Abood does not stand for 
the proposition that all government employers should permit fair share fees.  
Rather, it gives proper deference to governmental employers who choose to 
manage their workforces by permitting fair share fees.  Accordingly, the fact 
that some governmental employers hold different views on how to achieve 
labor peace is of no consequence, as employers often believe that unions need 
adequate funding for exclusive representation to work.[41] 
The majority also dismisses the free-rider concerns addressed in Abood.[42]  
Relying on Knox, the majority finds that “avoiding free riders is not a 
compelling interest.”[43]  Pointing to the fact that unions continue to seek to 
represent employees in states that do not permit fair share fees, the majority 
essentially faults unions for their persistence in organizing in those 
states.[44] After all, under the Knox theory, if the benefits derived from 
exclusive representation are not outweighed by the burden of a prohibition 
against fair share fees, surely, unions would refrain from organizing in those 
states.[45] This reasoning demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the nature of fair share fee arrangements.  Labor relations and fair share fees 
are policy matters that are best left to state and local legislatures, not the 
judiciary, to decide.  That unions continue to seek exclusive representative 
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status in right to work states is not a compelling reason to depart from the 
traditional deference given to governmental employers when dealing with 
policy matters and workplace regulation. 
Furthermore, it cannot be overlooked that this decision improperly penalizes 
unions by making union membership significantly less attractive. The 
majority recognizes that “government may not ‘impose penalties or withhold 
benefits based on membership in a disfavored group’ where doing so 
‘ma[kes] group membership less attractive.”[46]  However, as Justice Kagan 
points out, “basic economic theory shows why a government would think 
that agency fees are necessary for exclusive representation to work.  What 
ties the two together, as Abood recognized, is the likelihood of free-riding 
when fees are absent.”[47] Unlike other special interest groups that can make 
membership more attractive by offering special benefits to members, unions 
are prohibited from treating members and non-members differently. Thus, 
requiring unions to represent everyone equally without requiring those who 
benefit to pay a fee for services rendered operates as a penalty against a 
disfavored group for the purpose of making group membership less 
attractive.  As Justice Kagan notes, the end result is that “[e]veryone – not 
just those who oppose the union, but also those who back it – has an 
economic incentive to withhold dues[48]   
The Abood Court recognized that the “designation of a union as exclusive 
representative carries with it great responsibilities” as well as significant 
costs, and that fair share fees were a reasonable way to fairly distribute these 
costs among all who benefit therefrom.[49] The majority opinion, however, 
refuses to acknowledge the costs associated with such duties; and instead 
focuses on the “many benefits” that come with exclusive representation, and 
the “special privileges” that are granted to unions.[50] Clearly, the majority 
purposefully ignores the economic realities of prohibiting fair share fees.  As 
Justice Kagan poignantly states: 
[T]he majority again fails to reckon with how economically rational actors 
behave . . . Without a fair-share agreement, the class of union non-members 
spirals upward . . . [a]nd when the vicious cycle finally ends, chances are 
that the union will lack the resources to effectively perform the 
responsibilities of an exclusive representative–or, in the worst case, to 
perform them at all.[51] 
The likelihood that bargaining unit employees will choose not to become 
union members is significant.  After all, why would anyone pay for something 




they can get for free?  The risk is that unions will be financially crippled, and 
unable to afford to operate, rendering these special benefits and privileges 
utterly meaningless. 
The majority opinion represents a significant departure from the Court’s 
long history of valuing democracy in the workplace. For the first time, the 
rights of individuals are held in higher regard than the rights of the collective 
majority. To reach this decision, the majority equates fair share fees with 
requiring individuals to support the union. However, nothing could be 
further from the truth. Non-members are free to voice whatever opinions 
they choose, in any forum. No matter what opinions are voiced by those who 
oppose them, the union’s obligations remain the same. Because employees 
remain free to voice their opposition to the union, fair share fees do not 
compel anyone to support the union or any positions it advances. 
The majority also overlooks that the costs of fair share fees are minimal.  The 
petitioner’s annual fair share fees were a mere $535.[52] The cost of one 
arbitration hearing alone often far exceeds $5,000. Thus, the requirement to 
pay such minimal fees, especially when compared with the costs associated 
with the duty of fair representation, hardly infringes on free speech rights.  
Yet, the majority is of the opinion that “[d]esignating a union as the 
employees’ exclusive representative substantially restricts the rights of 
individual employees” because individuals “may not be represented by any 
agent other than the designated union; nor may individual employees 
negotiate directly with their employer.”[53]  
This argument is entirely misplaced, and completely incompatible with the 
majority’s acknowledgement that exclusive representation comes with great 
rights and privileges. The rights and privileges gained by unions are used 
solely for the benefit of bargaining unit employees.  The majority’s opinion 
that exclusive representation restricts the rights of individuals is belied by 
economic realities. In the absence of exclusive representation, where will 
employees find someone to represent them in costly litigation for an annual 
fee of $535?  They cannot, which is why democracy in the workplace is so 
vital. It gives bargaining unit employees a voice they otherwise do not have, 
and access to litigation they otherwise cannot afford.   
In an effort to resolve this dilemma, the majority claims that the burden of 
exclusive representation imposed upon unions is inconsequential because 
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“[i]ndividual nonmembers could be required to pay for that service or could 
be denied union representation altogether,” citing to a single state law that 
authorizes unions to charge religious objectors who use the grievance or 
arbitration procedures for the reasonable costs associated with those 
procedures.[54] Oddly, though, the majority also cites to Section 6(g) of the 
IPLRA, which permits those who object to fair share fees for religious 
reasons to pay the same amount to a non-religious charitable 
organization.[55] However, the IPLRA is devoid of any requirement that 
such individuals pay for costs associated with use of grievance 
proceedings.[56] Nothing in the IPLRA permits unions to charge for costs 
associated with the use of grievance proceedings.  Instead, like many other 
States, such a requirement can only be accomplished through legislative 
measures.  It is utterly inappropriate for the Court to justify overturning 
long-standing precedent based on legislation that could be enacted.   
Fair share fees result in minimal infringements on free speech rights.  Such 
minimal infringements clearly do not outweigh the burdens imposed upon 
the government and unions so as to justify such a drastic departure from the 
Court’s historical treatment of fair share fees. 
B. Fair Share Fees are Now the Exception to the Rules Concerning 
Public Employee Speech 
The historical deference given to public employers in managing their 
workforce and regulating speech is not without limits. Rather, “[t]he 
government . . . needs to show that legitimate workplace interests lay behind 
the speech regulation.”[57]  Thus, a two-part test arose out of three Supreme 
Court decisions that form the basis for determining whether a public 
employee’s speech is protected.[58] First, it must be determined whether the 
individual spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.[59] If the 
individual spoke as an employee on a workplace matter, there is no 
constitutional protection, and the public employer is allowed to regulate the 
speech.[60] However, if the individual spoke as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern, the second step of the analysis focuses on “whether the relevant 
government entity had adequate justification for treating the employee 
differently from any other member of the general public.”[61]   
The majority opinion dismisses Abood’s balancing protected speech and the 
government’s interest in regulating its employees’ speech.[62] However, the 
majority’s analysis is misplaced because it improperly focuses on the nature 




of the regulation (i.e. compelling support of the union), and whether the 
speech impacts the government’s budget.  This is a slippery slope because the 
category of speech that could impact a government’s budget is vast. Taking 
this argument to its logical conclusion means that even the most trivial 
workplace concerns are matters of public concern simply because they 
impact the budget. Carving out a new exception to long-established public 
employee speech rules will only result in confusion and expose state and local 
governments to increased litigation. 
The majority recognizes that a state’s ability to require unions to fairly 
represent all bargaining unit employees is “itself a significant impingement 
on associational freedoms that would not be tolerated in other contexts,” but 
“draw[s] the line at allowing the government to go further still and require 
all employees to support the union irrespective of whether they share its 
views.”[63] Thus, the majority readily accepts limitations on associational 
freedoms as applied to unions, but rejects limitations on public employee 
speech rights as applied to individuals who oppose unions.  This is especially 
true where, as here, the limitations on public employee speech are intended 
to balance the burden imposed by the duty of fair representation.  The 
majority’s theory is that fair share fees amount to “compelling” those 
individuals to support union speech. It ignores Abood’s limitations on 
chargeable expenses, and that bargaining unit employees remain free to 
voice their opinions and opposition to the union, or the positions it advances. 
One of the most significant hurdles to overturning Abood was the Court’s 
long-standing belief that speech related to collective bargaining was not a 
matter of public concern.[64] The majority now claims that “[w]hen a large 
number of employees speak through their union, the category of speech that 
is of public concern is greatly enlarged, and the category of speech that is of 
only private concern is substantially shrunk.”[65]  Citing the Illinois budget 
problems, the majority views any demand from a public sector union that 
impacts the employer’s budget as a matter of public concern.[66] Thus, 
contrary to the Court’s historical treatment of collective bargaining, the 
majority declared that speech related to collective bargaining “is 
overwhelmingly of substantial public concern.”[67]   
This raises more constitutional questions than it resolves. Almost every issue 
raised by a union has the potential to impact the employer’s budget. Does 
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this now mean that all issues raised by a union are matters of “substantial 
public concern”?  If so, that means such speech should be given greater, not 
less, protection. Yet, it appears from the majority’s opinion that the intent is 
to carve out an exception for a small minority of individuals who do not want 
to be union members, while not affording the same status to the collective 
interests of the bargaining unit.  This is completely contrary to this country’s 
system of collective bargaining, which necessarily “subordinates the interests 
of an individual employee to the collective interests of all employees in a 
bargaining unit.”[68] There is simply no constitutional justification for 
giving greater protection to those who oppose unions than those who support 
them. 
To fit this new framework, the majority distorts the test by focusing on 
“whether the public is, or should be, interested in a government employee’s 
speech.”[69] Importantly, this approach is fundamentally flawed because, 
arguably, most issues raised by public sector unions impact the 
governmental employer’s budget. “Instead, the question is whether that 
speech is about and directed to the workplace–as contrasted with the 
broader public square.”[70]  Clearly, speech involving collective bargaining 
is “intimately tied to the workplace and employment relationship.”[71] Such 
speech occurs in the workplace, directly concerns the workplace, and is 
addressed to the employer, thereby satisfying the Court’s well-established 
standards for determining whether governmental limits on workplace 
speech pass constitutional muster. “Abood allowed the government to 
mandate fees for collective bargaining–just as Pickering permits the 
government to regulate employees’ speech on similar workplace matters. . . .  
Abood thus dovetailed with the Court’s usual attitude in First Amendment 
cases toward the regulation of public employees’ speech.”[72]  
As Justice Kagan notes, the balance struck in Abood gave great deference to 
the government’s role as an employer, “[a]nd when the regulated expression 
concerns the terms and conditions of employment–the very stuff of the 
employment relationship–the government really cannot lose. . . . Except that 
today the government does lose, in a first for the law.”[73]  However, with 
this decision, the government is not the only loser; we all lose when 
democracy and free speech rights are threatened. By carving out exceptions 
that apply only to those who oppose unions, the Court has indeed threatened 
core democratic principles. 




C. Stare Decisis is Apparently Dead 
After determining that fair share fees violate the First Amendment, the only 
remaining hurdle the Janus Court faced was that of stare decisis. Stare 
decisis is an important doctrine because it ensures consistent and 
predictable outcomes, and preserves the integrity of the judicial process; the 
importance of which even the majority cannot deny.[74] Although the 
majority recognizes that the decision to overturn precedent should not be 
made lightly, the Court justified overturning Abood on the basis that it was 
incorrectly decided.[75] However, even if it were true that Abood was wrong, 
“[r]especting stare decisis means sticking to some wrong decisions.” Any 
departure from settled precedent (so the Court has often stated) demands a 
“special justification – over and above the belief that the precedent was 
wrongly decided.”[76]   
Stare decisis is central to our system of jurisprudence because it means the 
Court’s decisions are “founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of 
individuals.”[77] Clearly, Janus was based on the individual anti-union 
sentiments of the current majority. 
The majority opinion faults the Abood Court for relying on Railway 
Employees’ Dept. vs. Hanson,[78] and Machinists vs. Street,[79] two prior 
cases involving agency shop arrangements in the private sector. The Court, 
in Janus, finds that the “deferential standard” in those two cases “finds no 
support in our free speech cases.”[80]  The Court plainly ignores the fact that 
“Abood is not just any precedent: It is embedded in the law . . .  in a way not 
many decisions are.”[81] Yet, the majority glosses over Abood’s impact, and 
claims that “Abood does not seem to have anticipated the magnitude of the 
practical administrative problems that would result in attempting to classify 
public-sector union expenditures as either ‘chargeable’ . . . or 
nonchargeable.”[82]  The majority completely ignores the fact that, in the 
forty-one year history of Abood, “this Court has had to resolve only a handful 
of cases raising questions about the distinction” between chargeable and 
non-chargeable expenses.[83]   
In support of its argument that Abood is no longer workable, the majority 
cites to the “daunting and expensive task” faced by fair share fee objectors 
who “wish to challenge union chargeability determinations.”[84] The Court 
fails to explain why this is a compelling factor, especially when it ignores the 
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“daunting and expensive task” imposed upon unions by the duty of fair 
representation.  And, while there may be some gray areas requiring 
clarification between chargeable and non-chargeable offenses, “everyone 
knows the difference between politicking and collective bargaining.”[85] 
Thus, the majority’s attempt to attack the workability of Abood is weak, at 
best. 
The majority circles back to the notion that the principles of exclusive 
representation and fair share fees are mutually exclusive to support its 
argument that Abood is “an outlier among our First Amendment cases.”[86]  
The “developments” relied upon by the majority since issuance of Abood are 
the “ascendance of public-sector unions [that] has been marked by a parallel 
increase in public spending.”[87] However, even the majority cannot deny 
that the increase in public spending cannot be attributed solely to public 
sector unions.[88] More importantly, concerns over state and local 
government spending, and the costs of public employee wages and benefits, 
are policy matters that are best left to those governmental entities, as 
opposed to the judicial branch.  This is especially true where, as here, “Illinois 
and many governmental amici have explained again how agency fees 
advance their workplace goals.”[89]   
Additionally, the majority compares agency fees to the political patronage 
cases.[90] Simply stated, this argument makes no sense, and is another 
example of gross overreaching by the majority. No bargaining unit employee, 
regardless of membership status, is required to support a particular 
politician, or political activity. Indeed, the entire purpose of fair share fees is 
to prohibit unions from using non-members’ funds for political purposes and 
activities. Yet, the majority views this decision as “bring[ing] a measure of 
greater coherence to our First Amendment law.”[91] Nothing could be 
further from the truth, as this decision accomplishes the exact opposite. 
Finally, the majority finds reliance an insufficient reason to uphold Abood.  
In support of this finding, the Court notes that “public-sector unions have 
been on notice for years regarding this Court’s misgivings about Abood.”[92] 
The majority reasons that, “[d]uring this period of time, any public-sector 
union seeking an agency-fee provision in a collective bargaining agreement 
must have understood that the constitutionality of such a provision was 
uncertain.”[93] Such an argument is preposterous. It ignores the long history 
of Abood, and reasonable reliance on the principles of stare decisis. It also 
ignores the thousands of collective bargaining relationships developed over 




decades between unions and employers; relationships that developed under 
the framework of fair share fees.  Removing fair share fees from the equation 
will undoubtedly inject substantial discord into those relationships. 
The majority also cites to the relatively short duration of public-sector 
collective bargaining agreements, and claims that “the union was able to 
protect itself if an agency-fee provision was essential to the overall bargain” 
because it “could have insisted on a provision giving greater protection.”[94]  
This argument is nonsensical, and the majority fails to explain what “greater 
protection” could be negotiated. Apparently, the majority views severability 
clauses as the answer.[95] Severability clauses commonly appear in 
collective bargaining agreements, and protect the integrity of said 
agreements by preserving the remaining portions of an agreement where one 
portion is deemed invalid. However, such clauses have nothing to do with 
securing adequate funding, and already appear in most, if not all, collective 
bargaining agreements. 
Moreover, the weakness of the majority viewpoint is underscored by its views 
on the impact resulting from the loss of fair share fees. Recognizing that the 
loss of fair share fees will cause “unions to experience unpleasant transition 
costs in the short term,” the majority is of the opinion that it “may require 
unions to make adjustments in order to attract and retain members.”[96] 
Yet, because the duty of fair representation ties the union’s hands, few, if any, 
adjustments can be made that will enable unions to effectively attract and 
retain members. Thus, the majority’s inability to articulate how unions can 
adjust for the loss of fair share fees is understandable because the unions’ 
hands are tied. 
These illogical leaps underscore the majority’s desperation to fit a square peg 
into a round hole. Indeed, this is most evident in the Court’s opinion 
concerning “the considerable windfall that unions have received under 
Abood for the past 41 years.”[97]  Elaborating further, the majority finds that 
“[i]t is hard to estimate how many billions of dollars have been taken from 
nonmembers and transferred to public-sector unions in violation of the First 
Amendment.”[98] Such findings make a mockery of our system of 
jurisprudence.  As Justice Kagan notes, stare decisis is strengthened by the 
legislature’s and citizens’ reliance on Supreme Court precedent, and the 
majority opinion “wreaks havoc on entrenched legislative and contractual 
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arrangements” that arise in the context of a continuing relationship between 
employers and unions.[99] More importantly, borrowing a quote from 
Justice Scalia, Justice Kagan notes that “‘reliance upon a square, 
unabandoned holding of the Supreme Court is always justifiable 
reliance.’”[100]   
Thus, notwithstanding the lack of exceptional circumstances or special 
justifications for departing from stare decisis, the Court made clear its 
willingness to legislate from the bench.  As Justice Kagan so eloquently 
stated: 
The majority has overruled Abood for no exceptional or special reasons, but 
because it never liked the decision.  It has overruled Abood because it 
wanted to.  Because, that is, it wanted to pick the winning side in what 
should be–and until now, has been–an energetic policy debate. . . . Today, 
that healthy–that democratic–debate ends.  The majority has adjudged who 
should prevail. . . .  And maybe most alarming, the majority has chosen the 
winners by turning the First Amendment into a sword, and using it against 
workaday economic and regulatory policy.  . . .  The First Amendment was 
meant for better things.  It was meant not to undermine but to protect 
democratic governance–including over the role of public-sector 
unions.[101] 
This decision is a slippery slope because it has the potential to “expos[e] 
government entities across the country to increased First Amendment 
litigation and liability.”[102] Indeed, this decision creates more 
constitutional questions than it resolves, as union speech now has a new 
constitutional status.  However, the real test is yet to come.  The Court will 
be likely be required to address increased constitutional challenges in this 
area of public employee speech.  Only then will we see whether the Court is 
willing to extend this new constitutional status to pro-union speech. 
Moving forward, unions and state and local governments are faced with an 
onerous task.  The relationships built between public sector unions and state 
and local governments have developed over the course of more than four 
decades.  The prohibition against fair share fees means that these parties will 
have to re-write legislation and thousands of collective bargaining 
agreements, and re-think labor relations in a climate of great uncertainty. 




III. LEGISLATIVE AND LEGAL MOVES INVOLVING JANUS 
Janus is a major destabilizing event in what had been an area of law that was 
well settled for the past forty years. The legal understanding since Abood had 
been incorporated into twenty-plus public sector collective bargaining 
statutes across the country. However, the Janus decision had been lurking 
on the horizon since Justice Alito started lining up his legal dominos, and 
significant preparation had been put in place prior to the decision by unions 
on one side and the special interest third parties on the other. Since the Knox 
decision and Justice Alito’s clearly telegraphed desire to take down public 
sector collective bargaining, parties on both sides of the issue have been 
preparing for the day this decision came down. With the appointment of 
Justice Gorsuch to the Court, the decision issued by the Court on June 27, 
2018 felt largely inevitable. Prior to the Court issuing its decision, legislative 
as well as legal action had already been taken in anticipation of the Court’s 
ruling. The following will examine the legal challenges and legislative 
changes prompted by Janus’ predecessor cases and those that have emerged 
since the decision issued. 
A. Legislative Actions 
Several states passed legislation before the decision was issued, mostly 
focusing on everything from union access to new employees to proper 
periods for membership revocation as well as personal information 
protection. California passed the most bills addressing the possible impacts 
of Janus, but states from the West coast to the East coast acted to address 
possible fallout from the decision. The following survey of legislation passed 
in anticipation of Janus may suggest ways other states may handle the fallout 
from the decision. 
California was by far the most preemptively active state in passing legislation 
to deal with the implications of the Court’s Janus decision, enacting four laws 
to deal with the impact of the Court’s decision. Assembly Bill 119 was signed 
into law by Governor Jerry Brown on June 27, 2017 and took effect 
immediately. The legislature, in drafting and passing the legislation stated:  
The Legislature finds and declares that the ability of an exclusive 
representative to communicate with the public employees it represents is 
necessary to ensure the effectiveness of state labor relations statutes, and 
the exclusive representative cannot properly discharge its legal obligations 
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unless it is able to meaningfully communicate through cost-effective and 
efficient means with the public employees on whose behalf it acts. In most 
cases, that communication includes an opportunity to discuss the rights and 
obligations created by the contract and the role of the representative, and to 
answer questions. That communication is necessary for harmonious public 
employment relations and is a matter of statewide concern. Therefore, it is 
the Legislature’s intent that recognized exclusive representatives of 
California’s public employees be provided meaningful access to their 
represented members as described in this chapter unless expressly 
prohibited by law. [103] 
The law adds Sections 3555 to 3559 to the California Government Code to 
amend the California’s labor relations act. [104] The added sections 
expanded the act’s coverage, making it applicable to cities, counties, special 
districts, trial courts, state civil service agencies, the Los Angeles County 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, public schools (K-12), community 
colleges, California State Universities, Universities of California and school 
districts.[105]   
Assembly Bill 119 also amended the Section 6253.2 and 6254.3 of the 
California Public Records Act. [106] Under the legislation, employers must 
give ten days’ notice to the union of new hire orientations, and the law applies 
to in person, online or through other means. The parties must bargain the 
structure, time and manner of union access to new employee orientation. 
Compulsory interest arbitration is required if the parties cannot reach an 
agreement on orientation access, with the parties splitting the cost of such 
arbitration. The parties may bargain an agreement that varies from the 
provisions of the law, but in the absence of such an agreement, the 
requirements of the law prevail. [107] 
The other significant provision of Assembly Bill 119 concerns the information 
that the public employer is required to supply to the exclusive bargaining 
representative.[108] The law amended the California Public Records Act, 
Sections 6253.2 and 6254.3 to require a covered public employer to provide 
the name, job title, department, work location, work, home and personal cell 
phone numbers, personal email address if on file with the employer and 
home address of newly hired employees to the exclusive bargaining 
representative within thirty days of the employee’s hire. The law also 
requires that the employer provide this information for all employees to the 
exclusive bargaining representative at least every 120 days.[109]  The law 
also exempts personal email addresses from public inspection unless the 




personal email address is used by the employee to conduct public business 
or is necessary to identify an otherwise disclosable communication. [110]  
California also passed Senate Bill 846, which was signed by the Governor on 
September 14, 2018 and became effective immediately. [111] California law 
had previously provided for the collection of agency fees under the Ralph C. 
Dills Act and the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act. Senate Bill 846 recognized that 
those statutory provisions were voided by the Janus decision, but addressed 
the possible liability of public employers and unions for having collected 
agency fees in the past. [112] Senate Bill 846 prohibits the state Controller, 
public employers, and employee organization, or any of their employees or 
agents from being liable under state law for collecting, deducting, receiving 
or retaining any agency fees collected under California Law.[113] The law 
grants complete immunity to any state law claims and denies standing to any 
current or former public employee for any fees properly collected under 
California law prior to June 27, 2018.[114]  The law applies to any currently 
pending claims at the time of signing, as well as claims filed on or after that 
date.[115]  The California legislature found the law “necessary to provide 
certainty to public employers and employee organizations that relied on state 
law, and to avoid disruption of public employee labor relations, after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Janus .  . .”[116]  
California Senate Bill 285 prohibits an employer deterring or discouraging 
employees becoming or remaining members of a union.[117] California law 
had previously prohibited state funds from being used to reimburse a state 
contractor for any costs incurred to assist, promote or deter union 
organizing, and prohibited public employers from receiving money from the 
state to make any such payments. The new law filled the gap and added the 
prohibition of using states funds to pay for efforts to encourage members to 
leave the union after the Janus decision. The bill also clarified the definition 
of public employer in this instance to apply to “counties, cities, districts, the 
state, schools, transit districts, the University of California, and the 
California State University, among others.”[118]  
While California was the most prolific state in enacting legislation in 
preparation for the Janus decision, it was not the only state to do so. For 
example, Delaware enacted House Bill 314.[119] Delaware HB 314 took a 
different approach from California, establishing a clear procedure and time 
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frame by which public employees may revoke their membership from a 
public employee union. [120] HB 314 passed the Delaware House on April 
19, 2018 on more or less a party line vote. [121] It passed the Senate on May 
5, 2018, with three Republicans joining the Democrats to vote yes, and it was 
signed by the Governor the next day.[122] 
HB 314 amended Delaware’s Public Employment Relations Act Section 1304 
to provide that an employee may choose to continue to pay a fair share fee as 
may be provided for in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). [123] If no 
valid process exists in the CBA, then an employee, by written authorization, 
may revoke his or her membership under the terms of the original 
authorization that the employee signed, so long as the authorization 
contained at least one revocation period. If the original authorization 
contained no revocation period, then a request can be made to the exclusive 
bargaining representative.[124]   
Delaware HB 314 also established timelines for when revocation may occur 
and when it becomes effective.[125] According to the language of the 
enactment, if an original authorization does not specify when a revocation 
becomes effective, the revocation will only become effective on the 
employee’s anniversary date. [126] The statute provides that if the revocation 
period is not provided by the original authorization, the revocation period 
shall be “during the period 15 to 30 days before the employee’s anniversary 
date of employment, effective on the employee’s anniversary date.” [127] 
Maryland also took legislative action to address implications of the Janus 
decision. The Maryland legislature put forth House Bill 811, cross -filed with 
Senate Bill 819.[128]  The bills passed the Senate on March 26, 2018 and the 
House on the next day. Despite lacking the governor’s signature, the bill 
became law under the provisions of Article II, Section 17 of the Maryland 
Constitution after the governor failed to return objections to the General 
Assembly within six days while the General Assembly was in session. [129] 
Maryland HB 811/SB 819 requires certain public school employers, namely 
any county board of education or the Baltimore City Board of School 
Commissioners, to provide an exclusive bargaining representative with 
access to newly hired employees, and largely tracks with the California 
legislation on the same issue.[130]  The exclusive bargaining representative 
must be provided at least ten days’ notice of new employee processing when 
the representative will be allowed access. Like the California law, the 




Maryland law requires that the structure, time and manner of the access to 
the new hires is determined through negotiations between the employer and 
the exclusive representative. 
By default a request to bargain access to new hires made between July 1, 2018 
and the expiration of the parties’ contract reopens the contract only for the 
purpose of establishing the time, manner and structure of access.[131] How- 
ever, the parties are free to agree to a separate agreement, such as a side letter 
or memorandum of understanding, instead of reopening the contract. [132]   
The parties have 45 days after the first meeting or 60 days after the initial 
request to negotiate to resolve any dispute over the structure, time and 
manner of access. [133]  After that point, either party may request the Public 
School Labor Relations Board to declare impasse and trigger the impasse 
procedures already contained in state statute. [134] 
Maryland’s legislation provides the standard by which the Public School 
Labor Relations Board should consider the matter before it.[135] The Public 
School Labor Relations Board is instructed to consider the ability of the 
exclusive representative to communicate with the employees it represents, 
the legal obligations of the exclusive bargaining representative, applicable 
state, local and federal laws, any stipulations of the parties, the financial 
condition of the public schools and the interests and welfare of the 
employees, access provided in comparable public school communities, and 
“other facts routinely considered in establishing” such access.[136] 
Similarly to the California statute, Maryland House Bill 811 requires that the 
public school employer provide certain information to the exclusive 
bargaining representative by amending Section 6-407.2 of Maryland’s 
Education statute. [137]  Under the amendment, the public school employer 
must provide the exclusive bargaining representative, within 30 days of the 
date of hire for a new employee, the new employee’s name, position 
classification, home and work address, home and work telephone number, 
personal cell phone number, and work email address. This requirement 
attaches with all new hires, regardless of whether the newly hired employee 
had been previously employed by the public school employer. There is no 
requirement to provide personal email addresses. The public school 
employer must provide the same information for current employees once 
every 120 days. [138]  
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Maryland passed an almost identical bill, HB 1017/SB 677, which addressed 
exclusive bargaining representative access to newly hired state employees, 
including those of the public colleges and universities, and the right of the 
exclusive bargaining representatives to information about those 
employees.[139] The minor differences are that the exclusive representative 
has the right request information from the Department of Budget and 
Management once every 120 days.[140] The Department of Budget and 
Management and the exclusive bargaining representative may negotiate a 
more frequent basis to provide the information, and the parties may 
negotiate more detailed information to be provided than what is listed in the 
statute. The information must also be presented to the exclusive bargaining 
representative in a “searchable and analyzable electronic format.”[141]  
The bill removes a prior prohibition on an exclusive representative, or an 
authorized third party on its behalf, to use the information it receives for the 
purpose of maintaining or increasing employee membership in a union.[142]  
Previously, the exclusive bargaining representative had been prohibited 
from using information provided by the employer for the purpose of 
increasing employee membership. The enactment further  provides that on 
the written request of an employee, an exclusive bargaining representative 
shall “withhold further communication with an employee unless otherwise 
required by law or written request is revoked by the employee.”[143] While 
this in some way limits the exclusive bargaining representative’s ability to 
use the information, the limitation is balanced by the exclusive bargaining 
representative now being expressly permitted to use the employee 
information it receives from the employer to maintain or increase employee 
membership. 
Washington, like California and Maryland, codified an exclusive bargain 
representative’s access to new employees at employee orientation. Senate 
Bill 6229 passed the Washington State Senate on February 27, 2018, and the 
Washington State House on February 27, 2018. It was signed into law by the 
governor on March 23, 2018.[144]   
The Bill created several new sections of statute in Washington’s public 
employees’ collective bargaining statute. The most signification change was 
an addition to Washington state statute Chapter 41.56.[145] That addition 
requires the employer to give the union reasonable access to new employees 
“for the purpose of presenting information about their exclusive bargaining 
representative.”[146] The legislature defined reasonable access as occurring 




within 90 days and for no less than 30 minutes, and must occur during the 
employee’s regular working hours.[147] However, the employer and union 
may agree to longer or more frequent access than is provided for in the 
statute.[148] The presentation should occur during the new employee’s 
orientation, unless the employer and union have negotiated another 
arrangement. However, no employee is required to attend the meeting with 
the exclusive bargaining representative.[149]. The act applies to community 
colleges, school district employees, faculty at public four year colleges and 
universities, employees of the state of Washington, county or municipal 
corporation, or any political subdivision of the state of Washington, 
including district courts and superior courts, ferry employees, and symphony 
musicians.[150]  
New Jersey also passed legislation anticipating Janus and its potential 
impact on public sector collective bargaining. The New Jersey Assembly 
passed, and the governor signed, the “Workplace Democracy Enhancement 
Act,” which became effective on May 18, 2018.[151] Like California, 
Maryland and Washington, New Jersey codified an exclusive bargaining 
representative’s right of access to newly hired employees.[152] Access to 
newly hired employees must be provided within 30 calendar days of the date 
of hire, last for at least 30 minutes but not more than 120 minutes, and be 
conducted without effect on the employee’s pay or leave time.[153] Access is 
provided at new employee orientation, or if no orientation is conducted, in 
individual or group meetings.[154]  
The act requires access to current bargaining unit members as well. A public 
employer must provide access to the work place.[155] Access under the 
statute includes the right to meet with individual employees during the work 
day to investigate and discuss grievances, as well as workplace-related 
complaints and other workplace issues.[156] The Act also provides that 
exclusive bargaining representatives will have access to the workplace to 
hold meetings during employees’ lunch, breaks and before and after shifts to 
discuss workplace related issues, such as contract negotiations or 
enforcement, as well as meetings about internal union matters such as 
governance or other internal business matters. Exclusive bargaining 
representatives are also permitted to use, subject to possibly paying for 
maintenance, security and other costs if applicable, government owned or 
leased buildings to conduct meetings with bargaining unit members, so long 
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as those meetings to do not interfere with government operations or involve 
any form of campaigning for any partisan political office.[157]  
The Workplace Democracy Enhancement Act requires the public employer, 
within ten days of hire of a new employee, provide to the exclusive bargaining 
representative contact information for the employee, including name, job 
title, date of hire, worksite, home address, work telephone numbers and any 
home or cell phone numbers on file with the employer, work email address 
and personal email address if it is on file with the employer.[158] The act 
mandates that the information be presented in Excel format or a format 
mutually agreed to by the parties.[159]  Exclusive bargaining representatives 
have the right to use the employer’s email system to communicate with 
bargaining unit members, as well.[160] Employee information such as home 
addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, dates of birth, and negotiation 
units and groupings of employees, and the emails or other communications 
between employee organizations and their members, prospective members, 
and non-members are not considered government records, and, therefore, 
are exempt from the state’s Open Public Records Act.[161]    
The act penalizes public employers for encouraging bargaining unit 
members to revoke their membership in the exclusive bargaining 
representative, and for discouraging employees from joining, forming or 
assisting an employee organization.[162]  Engaging in any of the prohibited 
acts is an unfair labor practice and, upon finding that the violation occurred, 
the Public Employee Relations Commission is required to order the exclusive 
bargaining unit representative be made whole for any losses suffered from 
the public employer’s violations, among any other remedial relief.[163]. 
The Act also restricts the time period that employees can withdraw from 
membership in the exclusive bargaining representative organization.[164] 
Employees who wish to revoke their authorizations for dues deductions may 
do so by written notice to the employer during the ten days following each 
anniversary date of their employment.[165] The withdrawal becomes 
effective on the thirtieth day after the employee’s anniversary date.[166]  
Within five days of the receipt of the written request, the public employer 
must provide notice to the exclusive bargaining representative of the 
withdrawal of authorization.[167] However, the legislation allows  the pubic 
employer and exclusive bargaining representative to agree that requests for 
withdrawal of authorization must go through the exclusive bargaining 




representative and establish the effective date of revocation as the July 1st 
following the date on which the notice was filed.[168]  
New York also enacted legislation granting exclusive bargaining 
representatives access to new employees. New York passed the protections 
in section RRR of its revenue bill in April of 2018.[169] The legislation 
provides, much like the previously discussed states, that a public employer 
must give notice to the exclusive bargaining representative within 30 days of 
making a new hire and inform the representative of the employee’s name, 
address, job title, employing agency, department and work location. Within 
30 days of providing the notice, employer must give the representative a 
reasonable amount of time during the employee’s work time to meet with the 
employee.[170]   
Unlike the other states, New York’s legislation exempts all public employee 
exclusive bargaining representative organizations from being required to 
provide services and representation to non-member employees.[171] The 
legislation specifically does not require a union to provide representation to 
a non-member when he or she is being questioned by the employer, in 
statutory or administrative proceedings over statutory or administrative 
rights, in any stage of the grievance, arbitration or other contractual process 
dealing with assessing discipline so long as the non-member is permitted to 
proceed without the union and allowed to retain his or her own 
advocate.[172] The legislation specifically permits the union to restrict 
providing representation in certain administrative and employer based 
proceedings to union members only, with no threat of an unfair labor 
practice charge for not representing members.[173]  
Although New York’s is the broadest exemption from representation of non-
members to be passed in anticipation of Janus, it is not unique in the nation. 
Florida, the first state to pass a right to work statute in 1943 and 
constitutional amendment in 1968, has had a statutory provision since 1977 
which provides that unions may refuse to represent non-members.[174]  The 
provision has gone without direct legal challenge since its passage and is a 
clear indicator that such statutory provisions should be legally viable. 
The New York governor also issued an executive order protecting state 
workers’ information from being given to third parties. Executive Order 183 
was signed by the governor on June 27, 2018, the day that the Janus decision 
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issued.[175] The executive order states that workers’ home addresses and cell 
phone numbers are “being used to attack, harass, and intimidate them.”[176]  
It further stated that New York State would not permit its public sector 
workers’ private information to be “abused” “as part of a campaign to harass 
and intimidate workers for any reason, including engaging in union activities 
or looking to unionize.”[177]  The executive order prohibits any state entity, 
its officers or employees from disclosing the home address, personal 
telephone numbers, cell phone numbers, and email addresses of a public 
employee except to a union who represents the employee, a union seeking to 
represent the employee and if legally compelled to do so.[178]  
Traveling to the farthest west state in the Union, Hawaii passed legislation 
to establish the process by which public employees may revoke their 
membership in a union.[179] The Hawaii legislation requires that an 
employee provide written notice to the union to revoke payroll 
deductions.[180] The written revocation must be delivered to the union 
within 30 days before the employee’s anniversary date.[181]  The union then 
has ten business days to inform the employer of the employee’s revocation of 
deductions.[182] 
Rhode Island took a legislative approach similar to New York’s in relation to 
representation requirements for non-member employees. Senate Bill 2158 
Substitute A, which applied only to police and fire units in the state,[183] 
exempts police and fire unions from representing employees in any level of 
the grievance process, including arbitration, when the employees have 
elected to not become members of the union or when they revoke their 
membership status.[184]  Non-member employees may proceed through the 
grievance process at their own cost, but the union must have the opportunity 
to be present at any hearing.[185] Furthermore, the resolution of the 
grievance must be consistent with the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement.[186] The legislation makes clear that a union has no obligation 
to incur any expenses in relation to an employee who has not been a member 
of the union for at least ninety days prior to the events giving rise to the 
grievance.[187]   
In contrast to the above-discussed legislative actions, public employee union 
detractors have proposed legislation in various states that has been drafted 
by groups such as the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). In 
Pennsylvania for example, legislation was proposed which would have 
amended Pennsylvania’s public sector bargaining law to define a 




nonmember and provide for “independent bargaining,” the direct bargaining 
between a public employee and public employer without a collective 
bargaining representative.[188] It would protect against discrimination in 
terms of benefits and pay against an employee engaged in independent 
bargaining.[189]. It would also require the public employer, on an annual 
basis, to notify all public employees in a bargaining unit that “there is no 
statutory obligation by nonmembers to make any payments” to the union 
that represents the bargaining unit.[190] The bill would require that 
employees be informed that they are not required to make any payments to 
the union unless they affirmatively assent, and that payment is not necessary 
to maintain employment.[191] The legislation would also permit employees 
to revoke their membership at any time in writing and would prohibit the 
union and employer establishing in the collective bargaining agreement any 
procedure for rescinding membership.[192] The bill, however, did not made 
it out of the Labor and Industry Committee.[193] 
The legislation that did not pass in Pennsylvania is similar to draft legislation 
that ALEC has provided. According to ALEC, the purposes of its proposed 
“Public Employee Bargaining Transparency Act,” (“PEBTA”) is to “avoid 
having public employees misled into forfeiting free speech rights and 
suffering financial loss.”[194] According to the model legislation, any 
authorization signed before June 27, 2018 would no longer be valid, and new 
authorizations must be freely given and shown by clear and convincing 
evidence.[195] Under the model legislation, employees may revoke their 
affirmative authorizations at any time, in writing, and such right to 
revocation can never be waived.[196] Under PEBTA, an employee’s 
employment or continued employment cannot be conditioned on payment 
to any charity or third party in the amount equivalent to dues or fees charged 
by a labor union, dues or fees to the union.[197]  
The model legislation goes so far as to include the text of the affirmative 
waiver required to allow deductions from an employee’s paycheck for dues 
or fees. The text reads: 
I recognize that I have a First Amendment right to associate. My rights 
provide that I am not compelled to pay a labor organization as a condition 
of employment, and I do not have to sign this waiver. However, I am hereby 
waiving my right to free speech and affirmatively consent to allow my 
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employer to deduct payments to a labor organization until such time as I 
choose to revoke this authorization.[198]  
The above notice would be required to be in bold and all caps in font equal 
to or larger than any other font on the document, and shall be a standalone 
document presented to the employee.[199] The model legislation also 
provides that any person suffering injury, real or threatened, resulting from 
violation of the statute has the right to filing a civil action for damages and 
injunctive relief, as well as mandatory cost shifting for a prevailing 
plaintiff.[200]  
B. Legal Challenges 
The legislative front is not the only venue in which reactions and pre-emptive 
actions have been taken regarding Janus. The courts have seen lawsuits filed 
both in anticipation of and reaction to the Court’s decision. At least 13 states 
have pending cases and range from Alaska to Maine. Some of the cases, such 
as those dealing with opt-out windows and member incentives, may have 
significant impacts on the legislation discussed above. This section of the 
paper will look at some of the pending litigation that has been spurned by 
Janus.  
Some cases brought are attempting to collect retroactively for fees collected 
before the Janus decision issued. Cases on the subject have been filed in 
Washington[201] and Minnesota.[202] Generally, in these cases the 
plaintiffs are seeking injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief.  There has 
been ongoing debate since the Janus decision issued as to whether these 
cases would be successful. Those who say unions can be liable for pre-Janus 
fees fall under a three step analysis. First, they assert that the decision is 
understood to be a statement by the Supreme Court of the law as it has always 
been, not a change in the law. Second, unions can be sued as private actors 
under Section 1983 because they used state power to collect the money. And 
third, unions do not have qualified immunity that is available to govern- 
ments in 1983 cases.[203] Those who do not believe that unions can be sued 
for fees collected before Janus respond by arguing that the unions acted in 
good faith when they collected the fees pre-Janus and did not know or could 
not have known that the state laws under which they operated were uncon- 
stitutional.[204] Only one case, Danielson v. AFSCME Council 28, [205] has 
been decided in this post Janus world. 




In Danielson, the plaintiffs filed suit as State of Washington employees who 
objected to forced union membership and did not want to pay agency 
fees.[206] The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgement that the imposition 
of agency fees violated the First Amendment, injunctive relief prohibiting the 
collection of such fees, monetary relief for agency fees wrongly collected, and 
attorney’s fees and expenses. [207] The court had previously dismissed the 
same claims made against Washington State as moot, because the state had 
voluntarily stopped deducting agency fees after the Janus decision, and there 
was no reasonable expectation that Washington State would begin collecting 
them again.[208] AFSCME Council 28 filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings or summary judgment on similar grounds. The U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Washington quickly dismissed the claims for 
declaratory and injunctive relief as moot, as there was little likelihood that 
the state or union would begin collecting agency fees again.[209] 
On the issue of monetary relief, the union argued that the defense of good 
faith applied.[210]. The defendants cited Wyatt v. Cole[211] as the basis of 
their good faith argument. In that case, the appeals court found that a 
defendant may be held liable for a violation of Section 1983 only if it failed to 
act in good faith in applying the unconstitutional state procedure.[212]  
Failing to act in good faith, as defined by the Wyatt Court depended on 
whether the defendant knew or should have known that the statute the action 
was based on was unconstitutional.[213] 
In the Daniels case, the defendant argued that no monetary damages should 
be awarded because it was acting under good faith when it collected fair share 
fees according to the state laws in effect at the time, which were 
presumptively valid until the Janus decision.[214]  Plaintiffs argued that the 
good faith defense should not apply because the most closely related 
common law tort, conversion, would not have conferred a similar immunity 
at the time that Section 1983 was enacted.[215]  The plaintiffs further argued 
that even if the good faith immunity did apply, the defendant had made no 
showing of a subjective state of mind.[216] 
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the good faith immunity does 
not apply as the Supreme Court has not foreclosed the defense and several 
circuit courts have relied upon it.[217] While the court acknowledged that 
the exact contours of the defense have never been clearly defined the defense 
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is based upon equity and fairness, and the court adapted the Fifth Circuit’s 
test from Wyatt as the standard to apply.[218] The court stated that the 
defense was clearly applicable in this case as the defendant could not have 
known, until the Janus decision was issued, that collecting agency fees was 
unconstitutional.[219]  After Janus was issued, the defendant immediately 
ceased collecting agency fees in compliance with the Court’s ruling and 
abandonment of fifty-year legal precedent.[220] 
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the court must analogize 
plaintiffs’ claim to a state common law claim, in this case conversion.[221] 
The court found that the plaintiffs’ argument lacked precedent in the Ninth 
Circuit.[222] Even if the court were required to compare an analogous 
common law, the court found that the plaintiffs were incorrect in arguing 
that conversion was analogous.[223] The court agreed with the defendant’s 
astute observation that the plaintiffs’ alleged harm was not the defendant’s 
receipt of the moneys, but the “dignitary harm resulting from being 
compelled to support speech with which they disagreed.”[224] Therefore 
defamation or tortious interference with contract would be more appropriate 
comparators.[225]  
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the defendant had the 
burden to show its state of mind and that plaintiffs should be entitled to 
discovery on that issue.[226] The court found that while the good faith 
defense usually requires showing a subjective state of mind, application of 
that requirement in this case would lead to “a perverse outcome.”[227] In 
this case, the court stated the outcome would turn on the subjective belief of 
an employee of the union and “[a]ny subjective belief [the union] could have 
had that the precedent was wrongly decided and should be overturned would 
have amounted to telepathy.”[228] Even though overruling Abood had been 
hinted at in the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions, the defendant should not 
be expected to have known that Abood was unconstitutional.[229]  
Expecting the defendant to have predicted the outcome of Janus 
“undermines the importance of observing existing precedent and ignores the 
possibility that prevailing jurisprudential winds may shift. This is not a 
practical, sustainable or desirable model.”[230] The court held that the good 
faith defense applied as a matter of law and shielded the defendant from 
liability for collecting pre-Janus agency fees and dismissed the case.[231]   
While this is the first case of its kind to be decided post Janus it is far from 
the only case. A California case, Wilford v. NEA, was filed in July as a class 




action with seven California teachers currently named as plaintiffs, at least 
four of whom were also plaintiffs in the Friedrichs case.[232] The complaint 
was filed to preserve the class members’ ability “to seek retrospective relief 
against the defendants as far back as the applicable statute of limitations will 
allow.”[233]  The complaint alleges violations of Section 1983, conversion, 
and restitution of money had and received.[234] The suit is seeking class 
certification, declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as reimbursement of 
all service or agency fees along with pre-judgment and post-judgment 
interest, damages and attorney fees under Section 1983.[235] Currently, this 
case is still in scheduling conference.  
As of 2018, there were more than 25 pending lawsuits regarding retroactive 
application of Janus and collection of past fees. One such case, Hoekman v. 
Education Minnesota, seeks to recover past collected dues for members and 
non-members alike, forming a sort of hybrid of the legal issues discussed 
above.[236] Needless to say, this will be a hot bed of litigation for a while 
after Janus, as Justice Alito seemed to go out of his way to encourage claims 
for retroactive relief because the Court’s overruling of Abood was 
foreseeable.[237] Should the lower courts continue to rule as the Eastern 
District of Washington did in Daniels, it is inconceivable that the cases will 
not be taken up on appeal considering Justice Alito’s language. 
The issue of class action status for non-members seeking to apply Janus 
retroactively has already been before the Supreme Court. After the Supreme 
Court’s Harris v. Quinn[238] holding that involuntary deduction of fair 
share fees for home health care assistants violated the First Amendment, 
Riffey v. Rauner[239] was filed on behalf of a class of home health care 
assistants. The Riffey plaintiffs sought to certify a class of all non-union 
member home health care assistants.[240]. The district court had denied 
class certification, finding the class to be overly broad, the named plaintiffs 
could not adequately represent the class, and individual questions regarding 
damages predominated over common ones.[241] The Seventh Circuit 
affirmed. 
The Seventh Circuit found that the proposed class contained a significant 
number of people whose First Amendment rights had not been violated, as 
65 percent of the assistants had gone on to join the union.[242] It also agreed 
with the district court’s finding that there were serious intra-class conflicts 
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and that the named plaintiffs could not fairly and adequately represent all 
prospective members.[243] The court agreed with the district court’s finding 
that the common questions did not predominate over questions affecting 
individual members in terms of determining who was owed what damages in 
the case.[244]  
The Supreme Court granted the plaitniffs’ petition for writ of certiorari and 
vacated and remanded the issue in light of its Janus decision.[245] On 
December 6, 2018, the Seventh Circuit again found that class certification 
was not appropriate.[246] The court stated that Janus had no impact on its 
decision because the status of the individuals in Riffey had already been 
decided in Harris, in terms of their First Amendment rights in relation to 
paying a fair share fee.[247] Therefore, “Janus simply did not affect whatever 
remaining class claims the putative class members in” Riffey might 
have.[248] It is inevitable that more class certification issues regarding 
Janus will come up, but Riffey may provide a good insight into how those 
arguments will play out.  
Another issue in pending litigation is whether union members are bound by 
the dues deduction contracts they signed before Janus. Ruling on cases in 
this area will have a large impact on much of the legislation that had been 
passed by states prior to Janus discussed above. One decision has been 
issued on the topic, Smith v. Superior Court, County of Contra Costa.[249] 
The court denied the plaintiff’s motion to enjoin defendants from continuing 
to deduct membership dues from his paycheck.[250]   
In Smith, the plaintiff, represented by the National Right to Work Legal 
Defense Foundation, sought a preliminary injunction against his employer, 
the Superior Court of Contra Costa County and his union, AFSCME Local 
2700.[251] Smith became a voluntary member of AFSCME Local 2700 on 
January 4, 2016, and signed a year-long contract with Local 2700 to pay 
dues. [252] The agreement to pay was not revocable except at the end of that 
first year or when the memorandum of understanding between the employer 
and the union expired.[253] Smith specifically consented to continue his 
dues deduction through the expiration of the memorandum of 
understanding, even if he resigned from the union.[254] The court found 
that Smith could not use the First Amendment to abandon his contractual 
duties.[255] The court quoted Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., for the rule that 
“the First Amendment does not confer . . . a constitutional right to disregard 
promises that would otherwise be enforced under state law.”[256]   




The court also found that Janus did not give the plaintiff the ability to get out 
of his contract with his union.[257] The court stated that the Janus decision 
applied to non-members who had opted out of union membership, and 
therefore could not be compelled to pay agency fees. It reasoned:  
Smith wants Janus to stand for the proposition that any union member can 
change his mind at the drop of a hat, invoke the First Amendment, and 
renege on contractual obligation to pay dues. Far from acknowledging that 
proposition, Janus actually acknowledges in its concluding paragraph that 
employees can waive their First Amendment rights by affirmatively 
consenting to pay union dues.[258]  
The plaintiff argued that he could not have “knowingly” consented to pay 
dues before Janus because he could not have known or understood the rights 
the case would inform him that he had.[259] The court rejected this 
argument because the plaintiff’s right to opt out of the union had been 
clarified in Abood, and he affirmatively waived that right by agreeing to be a 
dues paying member of his union.[260]  
The court also held that the plaintiff could not show irreparable harm 
required for a preliminary injunction because the defendant union had 
placed all of Smith’s dues collected after he resigned into an escrow 
account.[261]  Because the money was sitting in escrow, not only would it be 
available to Smith should he prevail, but it also could not be used to subsidize 
anything that could be considered compelled speech, which was the First 
Amendment right at the heart of Janus.[262] The court further noted that 
the plaintiff had failed to show that the opt-out form did not provide a way 
for him to stop his dues deductions. While the plaintiff called the 
authorization card “coercive” and “self-serving” the court was having none of 
it. It found that the authorization card was “a discretionary offer by Local 
2700 to amend the terms of the dues-deduction agreement before the 
contract requires the Union to do so.”[263]  The court dismissed the motion 
to enjoin the union.[264] 
A similar case has been filed in Pennsylvania involving a bus driver who was 
a union member and chose to resign his membership after Janus.[265] The 
plaintiff in Mayer v. Wallingford – Swarthmore School District, like the 
plaintiff in Smith, is represented by the National Right to Work Legal 
Defense Foundation. The claim in Mayer is similar to that in Smith, although 
the rejection of the plaintiff’s attempt to withdraw from the union was based 
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on a statutory requirement that withdrawal from the union happen in the 
fifteen days before a collective bargaining agreement expires, which was 
included in the employer and union’s collective bargaining agreement. Both 
defendants in the case have motions to dismiss the first amended complaint 
pending as of this writing. 
On November 13, 2018, the New Mexico Public Employee Labor Relations 
Board, in AFSCME Local 3277 v. City of Rio Rancho, delivered its opinion 
regarding the employer’s withholding of union members’ dues deductions 
after Janus.[266]  
The union filed for injunctive relief with the state labor board when the city 
refused to collect and distribute the dues of union members after the Janus 
decision.[267] Injunctive relief was granted by the general counsel and the 
city appealed to the Board.[268]  On appeal, the union further argued that as 
member dues are required by statute to be deducted from a union member’s 
paycheck until the member revokes according to the procedure in the 
collective bargaining agreement, the city was also in violation of the parties’ 
CBA.[269]  The city argued that the proper interpretation of Janus applied 
to current union members as well as non-members, and therefore a clear and 
affirmative consent for deductions is required so it was unclear if the original 
dues deduction consents were valid.[270] After oral arguments were held, 
the board found that the city’s withholding of dues deductions from current 
union members may exceed what is required under the Janus decision. 
Based on that finding, the board found the general counsel’s preliminary 
injunction to be justified.[271]  
An important developing area concerns challenges to exclusive 
representation. In July, the Buckeye Institute, a conservative advocacy group 
in Ohio with links to the National Right To Work Legal Foundation, brought 
a suit in Minnesota on behalf of Kathleen Uradnik against the Inter Faculty 
organization, St. Cloud State University and the Board of Trustees of the 
Minnesota State Colleges and Universities.[272] The complaint sought a 
preliminary injunction, alleging that the Inter Faculty Organization violates 
Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights when it speaks on her behalf.[273] 
Plaintiff is not a member of the union.[274] The district court, on September 
27, 2018, denied the plaintiff’s motion, stating that Supreme Court and Eight 
Circuit precedent have already rejected her arguments, and that even if 
exclusive representation rose to a First Amendment violation, the state 
statute would survive strict scrutiny.[275] 




While the plaintiff in Uradnik relied heavily on Janus, the district court 
rejected this argument.[276] The court stated that the Supreme Court’s 
decision addressed mandatory fees paid by non-union members, not 
exclusive representation, and that the Supreme Court in its opinion noted 
that it was “not disputed that the State may require that a union serve as 
exclusive bargaining agent for its employees.”[277]  The district court also 
noted that the Eighth Circuit had also distinguished Minnesota’s public 
sector bargaining law from that in Illinois, and stated that the Janus ruling 
did not invalidate the Minnesota statute.[278]   
The day after the district court’s decision, plaintiff appealed to the Eight 
Circuit. On December 3, 2018, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
ruling, finding that the plaintiff could not show a likelihood of success on the 
merits.[279] The next day, December 4, 2018, Uradnik filed a petition for 
certiorai in the Supreme Court.[280] A Supreme Court decision in this case 
could reshape the public sector labor law landscape in ways that the Janus 
decision only hinted at. Should cert be granted in this case, it will be the case 
to watch. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
What can be seen from the decisions that have come out thus far is that 
courts and the one labor board that have looked at the issue, are narrowly 
construing the holding in Janus to apply to fair share fee payers only. While 
the sample size is small, thus far courts and administrative agencies are 
unwilling to read Janus as applying to current union members, or see Janus’ 
holding as in any way changing the rights that were available to the 
individual when he or she willing became a union member.  
While the decision may be known in the Janus case, its impact is far from 
clear. While many states passed preemptive legislation, how effective that 
legislation will be depends greatly on how the cases currently pending in 
courts across the country are decided. At this point, public sector labor can 
look forward to several years of legal uncertainty and busy legislatures, if the 
lead up to and immediate aftermath of Janus are any indication.  
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By Student Editorial Board: 
Johnny D. Derogene, Patrick J. Foote, Miranda L. Huber, and Matt Soaper  
 
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee 
Relations Report.  It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the 
public employment relations community. This issue focuses on 
developments under the public employee collective bargaining statutes, the 
equal employment opportunity laws, and the First Amendment. 
I. IELRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Managerial Employees 
In Chicago Board of Education and Chicago Teachers Union,  35 PERI ¶ 109 
(IELRB 2018), the IELRB affirmed the administrative law judge’s 
recommended decision that College and Career Specialists in the Chicago 
Public Schools are not managerial employees.  The  union filed a majority 
interest petition to classify College and Career Specialist as an “educational 
employee” under the current collective bargaining agreement. The Chicago 
Board of Education claimed that these employees fall under the managerial 
exclusion, but the ALJ dismissed this defense.  
College and Career Specialists are part of the Office of College and Career 
Success in the Chicago Public Schools. The employees in this position are 
tasked with “improving college enrollment and persistence, and then move 
students into the workforce.” The ALJ found that this position's primary 
function was strategic planning. The specialists work with management to 
submit recommendations to senior leadership on the school’s post-
secondary goals. There was nothing in the record showing that employees in 
this position would ever create procedures without first speaking with 
management. This position did not act as the leader for each school’s post-
secondary team; rather, the position acted as a team member to facilitate 
discussion. Further, they made no budgetary decisions.  
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The IELRB began its analysis with the definition of a managerial employee 
under Section 2(o) of the IELRA: “An individual who is engaged 
predominantly in executive and management functions and is charged with 
the responsibility of directing the effectuation of such management policies 
and practices.” The IELRB stated that the College and Career Specialists did 
not perform executive or management functions because they: did not run 
the department, agency, or program; did not make recommendations 
independently; did not create goals for improving student post-secondary 
enrollment; and were merely advisory. Further, the position's role with side 
organizations was merely to provide information to the post-secondary team 
rather than lead that function. Finally, they lacked the power to control their 
budget. The IELRB further explained that even if the specialists did possess 
executive or management functions in their job, it was not their dominant 
function. Therefore, the position was entitled to representation under the 
IELRA  
II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Retaliation 
In Bowers and City of Chicago (Finance Department), No. L-CA-18-060 
(ILRB Local Panel 2019),the ILRB Local Panel held that the charging party’s 
evidence failed to support her claim that the City discharged her in 
retaliation for filing a previous unfair labor practice charge against the City, 
and for serving as a witness for the Union in a grievance. 
On September 22, 2016, Lachelle Bowers filed an unfair labor practice charge 
against the City alleging that the City had discriminated and taken frivolous 
disciplinary action against her. The record from this first charge 
demonstrated that Bowers had an extensive disciplinary history including 
insubordination, disrespectful and unprofessional behavior towards 
coworkers and supervisors, written and oral reprimands, and numerous 
suspensions. This charge was dismissed; however, it led to her second charge 
against the City.  
On May 21, 2018, Bowers filed an unfair labor practice charge against the 
City alleging that the City violated Sections 10(a)(1) and (2) of the IPLRA 
when it discharged her in retaliation for filing her first unfair labor practice 
charge city in 2016, and for serving as a witness for the Union in a grievance. 
The Executive Director dismissed this charge on the ground that Bowers 




failed to provide adequate evidence to raise any issue of fact or law that would 
warrant a hearing. Bowers appealed. 
The Local Panel found Bowers’ appeal meritless. The ILRB held that the 
Executive Director correctly decided that Bowers’ evidence failed to indicate 
a nexus between her protected activity and her discharge. The ILRB agreed 
with the Executive Director that timing alone was not enough to establish the 
requisite causal connection that the City discharged Bowers in retaliation for 
having previously filed an unfair labor practice charge against the city, and 
for serving as a witness for the Union in a grievance.  
Lastly, Bowers argued that “numerous material errors” led the Executive 
Director to erroneously dismiss her case. The ILRB held that Bowers failed 
to identify any such material errors or flaws in the Executive Director’s 
analyses, findings of fact, or conclusions. Accordingly, the ILRB affirmed the 
Executive Director’s dismissal of Bowers’ unfair labor practice charge against 
the City.  
III. EEO DEVELOPMENTS 
B. Age Discrimination 
In Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22 (2018), the United 
States Supreme Court held that states and their political subdivisions are 
“employers” covered by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act  
regardless of whether they have at least  20 employees. In reaching this 
decision, the Court interpreted “also means” in the ADEA’s definition of 
employer as additive rather than merely clarifying the meaning of employer. 
Mount Lemmon Fire District, a political subdivision in Arizona, laid off its 
two oldest full-time firefighters because of a budget shortfall. The laid off 
firefighters sued the Fire District alleging that their terminations violated the 
ADEA. Staffed with fewer than 20 employees, the District moved to dismiss 
the firefighters’ suit on the ground that the District was too small to qualify 
as an employer within the Act’s definition of employer.  
The ADEA defines “employer” to mean “a person engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day 
in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding 
calendar year . . . The term also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) 
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a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality 
of a State or a political subdivision of a State,” 
The issue presented was whether a state entity must employ 20 or more 
employees in order for it to be an employer under the ADEA?  This statutory 
interpretation issue originates from Congress’ amendment to the ADEA well 
over four decades ago in 1974. Prior to the 1974 amendment, state or local 
government entities were not employers under the ADEA. However, in 1974, 
Congress amended the ADEA to extend its protection to state and local 
government employees by specifying that the term employer “also means” a 
state or political subdivision of a state.  However, the Act is silent on whether 
a state or political subdivision of a State is also required to meet the 20 or 
more employees’ threshold. 
The District argued that when Congress added “also means” to the ADEA, 
the legislators intended to merely clarify that states and their political 
subdivisions were qualified to be employers, provided that they had 20 or 
more employees. On the other hand, the firefighters argued that when 
Congress added “also means” to the ADEA, the legislators intended to add 
new categories of employers to the definition, such that states and political 
subdivisions qualified as employers regardless of whether they employ 20 or 
more employees. 
 The Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Ninth Circuit that states and 
political subdivisions are employers within the meaning of the ADEA’s 
definitional provision regardless of whether they employ 20 or more 
employees. The Court held that the ordinary meaning of “also means” is 
additive rather than clarifying. The Court reasoned that the words “also 
means” occur dozens of times throughout the United States Code and they 
typically carry an additive meaning. The Court found that, similar to 
Congress’ amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) in 1974 that 
extended the FLSA’s definition of employer to all government entities 
regardless of their size, the ADEA warrants a similar interpretation especially 
because many aspects of the ADEA are based on the FLSA. Accordingly, the 
Court held that the ADEA carries no numerical threshold with regard to its 
application to states and political subdivisions. 




IV. FIRST AMENDMENT DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Exclusive Representation 
In Uradnik v. Inter Faculty Organization, 2018 WL 4654751 (D. Minn. Sept. 
27, 2018), aff’d, No. 18-3086 (8th Cir. Dec. 3, 2018), pet. cert. filed No. 18-
719 (Dec. 4, 2018), the United States District Court for the District of 
Minnesota denied plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to 
enjoin the Board of Trustees of the Minnesota State Colleges and 
Universities, St. Cloud State University, and the Inter Faculty Organization 
(“IFO”) from “regarding the IFO as her representative and allowing it to 
speak on her behalf.” 
The plaintiff was a tenured professor of political science who had worked at 
St. Cloud State University for 19 years. The IFO was elected and certified in 
1975 as the exclusive representative for the faculty at Minnesota’s seven 
public universities. According to Minnesota’s Public Employment Labor 
Relations Act (PELRA), election of an exclusive representative obligates the 
public employer to meet and negotiate about “issues surrounding the terms 
and conditions of employment.” PERLA also “grants public employees,” 
through their exclusive representatives, “the right to ‘meet and confer’ with 
their employers on matters outside the scope of mandatory negotiations.”  
The plaintiff, who has never been a member of the IFO and disagrees with 
the IFO on many issues, argued that the exclusive representation provisions 
of the PELRA compelled her speech in violation of her First Amendment 
rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association. The court, however, 
denied the preliminary injunction because plaintiff did not establish a 
likelihood that she would prevail on the merits of her claim.  In analyzing the 
likelihood of success, the court cited Minnesota State Board for Community 
Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984), where, the plaintiffs argued that 
exclusive representation under the PELRA violated their First Amendment 
rights by requiring the exclusive representative to speak on behalf of all 
employees in “meet and confer sessions.” The Supreme Court held that the 
PELRA did not restrain the the claimants’ freedom to speak on any 
education-related issue or to associate or not associate with whom they 
pleased, including the exclusive representative.” Uradnik argued that PELRA 
compelled her to speak through the IFO, an argument she maintained was 
not before the Court in Knight.  However, the court rejected this argument, 
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reasoning that “[t]he Court in Knight broadly rejected the appellee’s First 
Amendment . . . arguments, indicating that the decision applies regardless of 
the type of speech at issue.” Furthermore, in Bierman v. Dayton, 900 F.3d 
570 (8th Cir. 2018), a case attacking exclusive representation of home health 
care aids,  the “appellants made multiple compelled-speech arguments in 
their briefing.” That court held that “[t]here is no meaningful distinction 
between this case (Bierman) and Knight.”  
The plaintiff relied upon Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 
(2018). The court rejected this argument, because in Janus it “[was not 
disputed that the State may require that a union serve as exclusive bargaining 
agent for its employees.” Furthermore, the “main distinction” between Janus 
and the plaintiff’s claim was that Janus concerned non-members being made 
to subsidize the union through fees. Uradnik “[wa]s not required to pay fees, 
attend meetings, endorse the union, or take any other direct actions against 
her will.” The court also cited Bierman as holding that “recent holdings in 
Janus . . . do not supersede Knight.” 
The court further held that “[e]ven if Knight and Bierman did not preclude 
the plaintiff’s compelled speech argument,” the PELRA would pass the 
relevant level of constitutional scrutiny for compelled speech: exacting 
scrutiny. To survive an exacting scrutiny analysis, a statute must “serve a 
compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means 
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.” The court held that 
the PELRA serves the interest of providing Minnesota public employees with 
“representation and greater bargaining power” and “promotes the 
compelling state interest of labor peace.” The court further held that these 
interests could not be accomplished through significantly less restrictive 
means. Without exclusive representation, “the Union’s power and 
persuasion would be significantly eroded and the state interest in labor peace 
would be undermined.” 
On December 3, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Uradnik filed a petition for a 
writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court the following day. 
B. Fair Share Fees 
In Riffey v. Rauner, 910 F. 3d 314 (7th Cir. 2018), the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit denied class action status to a claim for restitution of fair 




share fees paid by home health care assistants that had been held 
unconstitutional in Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2623 (2014).  Following 
the Supreme Court’s decision, on remand to the district court, the plaintiffs 
amended their complaint to substitute new named plaintiffs and to 
substitute Governor Bruce Rauner for Pat Quinn. They sought to certify a 
class that included all non-union assistants who had fair-share fees collected 
from them from April 2008 until the date on which Harris was decided. The 
district court denied the motion to certify the class because the class was too 
broad, the named plaintiffs did not adequately represent the class, and the 
class appeared unmanageable. Because Harris had resolved the class-wide 
question about fair-share fees, only individual issues concerning relief 
remained. The Seventh Court affirmed, and the assistants went back to the 
Supreme Court.  The Court held Riffey in abeyance while it decided Janus v. 
AFSCME Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). The Court remanded Riffey to 
the Seventh Circuit for reconsideration in light of Janus.  
The Seventh Circuit noted that Janus and Harris differed at the outset 
because the plaintiff in Janus was a state employee, while the Harris plaintiff 
was not.  This meant that the Janus Court had to confront its prior decision 
in Abood v. Detroit Board. of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977). The Seventh 
Circuit reasoned that Janus had no impact on the remaining claims in Riffey; 
the Supreme Court had already dealt with the fair-share fee issue when it 
decided Harris. The court reiterated its reasoning from its holding in 2017, 
the first time it affirmed the denial of class certification, “[T]he question 
whether damages are owed for many, if not most, of the proposed class 
members can be resolved only after a highly individualized inquiry.” The 
appellate court noted that each putative class member would have to discuss 
his or her individual support or opposition to the union and any injuries 
opponents experienced. In turn, the union could assert defenses against each 
member. Further, even without the class certification, individuals still could 
pursue any funds to which they were entitled.  In light of the above, the 
Seventh Circuit again affirmed the district court’s decision to deny class 
certification to the plaintiffs. 
 
